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SUR-REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
- - - - - - - - -
There are a few points raised by the 
appellants in their Reply Brief which the 
respondents believe require answer. Leave of 
_ the Court is therefore requested to file this 
Sur-Reply Brief. 
POINT I 
The respondents alternately treat the two 
Van Kleeck companies as separate companies or as 
one company, depending upon how it meets their 
con'~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~Pd to the particular point 
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approach is logical. Regardless of the inter-
locking directors the two companies may have, so 
far as the State of Utah is concerned they are two 
separate and distinct corporations. Therefore, 
in answer to Point One raised in the appellants' 
reply brief, the facts of the ease are clearly as 
stated in the respondents' answering brier. 
The Van K~eeck-Bacon Investment Company was 
qualified in Utah at the time that it took deli-
very on the deed and executed the reconveyance 
agreement; however, The Van Kleeck Mortgase 
Company was not qualified to do business in 
Utah at the time it took the mortgage. In view 
of the fact that the mortgage was many years 
later released however, the invalidity thereof 
becomes important only if ~he respondents attempt 
to cite the extinguishment of the void mortgage 
as a consideration for the delivery of the deed. 
As has been pointed out before, it was not con-
sideration, first because the mortgage itself 
was void, and secondly, because, according to 
the deposition of Ross Bray, president of both 
companies, there were no inter-corporate.trans-
actions between the two companies involving the 
mort. ·~·--- _ 
-2-
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Again in Point Two in their Reply Brief, 
the appellants have failed to distinguish between 
the position ot the two companies. They have 
cited the ease of First National Bank of Price 
v. Parker, 57 Utah 290, 194 Pac. 661 to the 
effect that a deed to a non--qualified corporation 
is void and that a subsequent transfer by such 
corporation to a purchaser in good faith would 
likewise be void. This case might have some 
persuasive value, if in fact, The Van Kleeck-
Bacon Investment Company had not been qualified 
when the deed was delivered. The fact remains 
that the Investment Company was qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah. The invalidity 
of the deed arises not .from the incapacity ot 
the corporation to accept it, but first from the 
fact that it was not supported by a consideration, 
and the further fact that it was accompanied by 
a reconveyance agreement which makes of it an 
equitable mort~age ae has been argued in our 
answering brief. While both ot these defects 
are available as against the original grantee 
-3-
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in the deed. neither of thes~ are available as 
against a subsequent purchaser in good faith tor 
value. Therefore, as we have previously argued 
at some length, Jay Larsen's title is not in 
privity with the title or the defendant companies, 
and a successful defense by Jay Larsen would 
avail the defendant companies nothing in this 
action. 
POINT III 
The appellants, under their Point Three, 
maintain again that if they merely generally 
state that they have a good defense in their 
answer, the question of meritorious defense is 
taken care of. Once again we wish to state that 
we do not believe this to be true under the 
present rules of pleading where the complaint 
and answer are supplemented by depositions, 
admissions and other papers. The record is in 
such a state at the present time, based upon 
the admissions or the defendant companies' 
officers in their depositions that the plain-
tiffs would be entitled to a summary judgment. 
Under this point the appellants attempt to 
distinguish the case or Dunn v. Utah Serum 
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~mpany on the grounds that in that case the note 
was to be paid in Utah, whereas in the present case 
the note was to be paid in the State of Colorado. 
With this latter contention, we do not agree, but 
even it it were true, we are not here concerned 
with the validity of a note, but the validity of 
a mortgage which was a mortgage on Utah property, 
recorded in the State of Utah and whieb could be 
foreclosed only in the Utah courts. 
POINT IV 
Under their Point Four, the appellants 
take the position that on its merits the present 
case should be governed by the case of Thornley 
Land and Livestoek Co. v. Gailey, lOS Utah 519, 
14) Pae {2) 283, rather than by Bybee v. Stuart, 
112 Utah 462, 189 Pac (2) 118, previously quoted 
by the respondents. In making this argument, the 
appellants once again shift their position as to 
the eorporate identity of the defendant companies 
and take the position that they were in effect 
one company. The Thornley case held that a deed 
absolute should not be construed as an equitable 
mortgage because of the tact that the deed in 
-s-
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that case was given to satisfy an already existing 
~rtgaga. We wish to point out in this case first 
' that there was no pre .. existing mortgage in favo·r or 
the Investment Company, but only a void mortgage in 
favor of the MOrtgage Company. Futhermore, it 
• affirmatively appears that this mortgage was never 
assigned or in any way transferred from the MOrt-
gage Company to the Investment Company. Prior to 
} 
the execution of the deed and the reconveyance 
• 
agreement,- the Investment co·mpany; never acquired 
any interest, security or otherwise in the 
.subject property, and subsequent to the execut·ion 
ot the deed and the reconveyance agreement, it 
never at any time acquired such an interest from 
the Mortgage Company even i~ we assume· that the 
Mortgage Company acquired any interest by virtue 
ot the void mortgage. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY·, HAYES & RAMPTON 
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City,. Utah 
Attorneys tor Plaintiffs 
and Respondents·. 
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